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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FLINCO, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUB-
B~R COMP ANY, a Foreign Corpo-
ra hon, D f' d e en ant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
No. 
10321 
STATE.MENT OF THE NATURE OF THE 
CASE 
This action was brought by a dealer in tires, bat-
teries and accessories (TBA) to recover damages from 
its former supplier for the alleged breach of a dealer-
ship contract and for an alleged violation of a state 
antitrust statute, § 50-1-2 UTAH CODE ANN. (1953). 
Defendant counterclaimed to recover sums owing for 
goods sol<l and delivered ( R. 19-20). The allegations 
1 
of the counterclaim were not in dispute and plaintiff 
has paid in full the amount claimed (R. 27-30, 33). 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
The remainder of the case was tried before a jury, 
the IIonorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., presiding . .Follow· 
ing plaintiff's opening statement, defendant moved for 
a directed verdict on the grounds that on the law and 
the facts as asserted by plaintiff's counsel plaintiff was 
not entitled to relief ( R. 40-41, 52-53). The court took 
the motion under advisement and, following comple· 
tion of plaintiff's testimony on the issue of liability, 
granted it ( R. 224-230). 
RELIEl-. SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff has appealed for an order reversing the 
ruling of the trial court and requiring both of its claims 
to be submitted to the jury (R. 31). Defendant submits 
that the order of the trial court should be affirmed. 
TI-IE FACTS OF RECORD 
This case arises out of the termination of a fran· 
chise agreement (Ex. 1) by written notice dated Sep· 
tember 16, 1963 (Ex. 2). Under the agreement, signed 
by the parties on June 21, 1962, the plaintiff, Flinco, 
Inc. ( Flinco), had been a dealer in TBA manufactured 
by defendant, The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company 
(Goodyear) . 
2 
Plaintiff is a Utah corporation having its principal 
off ice and place of business at 133 North First West , 
Salt Lake City, Utah. At all times material it was an 
independent distributor of petroleum of the Texas 
Company (Texaco) to Texaco service stations in Salt 
Lake City and vicinity (R. 43). In 1962 and 1963 
Flinco was the contracted supplier of petroleum prod-
ucts to eleven of the approximately forty such stations; 
Flinco owned or leased six or eight of these eleven, 
which it either operated itself or leased to others (R. 
61, 83, 109). 
In about 1959 Flinco began to distribute auto-
mobile tires as a sideline to its petroleum business. In 
that year it distributed the U. S. Rubber Company's 
"Gillette" brand, but in early 1960 it switched to B. F. 
Goodrich Company's "Hood" line (R. 95-96; Ex. 4). 
In 1961 its purchases of Hood tires amounted to $88,-
000., and in the first six months of 1962 they totaled 
$54,000. (Ex. 5). This volume was achieved despite 
Texaco's policy that only the three major brands of 
tires (B. F. Goodrich, Firestone and U. S. Royal) 
might be charged on Texaco credit cards-a restriction 
which confined plaintiff's tire sales to its retail outlet 
at 133 North First 'Vest (R. 44-45, 106-107). 
Early in 1962 Texaco designated defendant Good-
year, a nationally known manufacturer of rubber prod-
ucts, as a fourth brand which might be charged on 
Texaco credit cards; and in May of that year G. E. 
apRoberts, plaintiff's vice-president, and Ed Ferguson, 
3 
then Goodyear district manager, began to discuss the 
feasibility of Flinco's becoming a franchised Goodyear 
dealer ( R. 47 -49) . On June 21 they signed the .Fran-
chise Agreement which is in evidence as Exhibit I. 
apRoberts admitted at the trial that Ferguson did not 
ask him to cancel the Hood contract in order to take 
on the Goodyear line, but that he chose to do so because 
Flinco could not afford the expense of carrying two 
separate inventories and because he was "not naive 
enough to have believed we would have received the 
Goodyear line without offering to terminate the Hood 
line" (R. 80-81, 102, 104-105). 
Paragraphs six, thirteen, and fourteen of the agree-
ment cover the subject of cancellation, and provide: 
6. Upon failure of the Dealer to make any 
payments when due, Goodyear may, at its op· 
tion, cancel this agreement or defer additional 
shipments until overdue accounts have been paid. 
Goodyear may decline to make deliveries except 
for cash whenever it is not satisfied with Dealer's 
financial responsibility. 
13. This agreement shall become effective 
when signed by an authorized District Manager 
of Goodyear and shall expire five ( 5) years from 
date of 
0
execution unless otherwise previously 
terminated as hereinafter provided. It cancels 
and supersedes any other Franchise. Agreement 
and any other sales agreement now m effect be· 
tween the parties covering th~ sale by Goodyear 
to the Dealer of any product mcluded hereunder. 
(Emphasis supplied). 
14. Thi8 agreement may b.e cancelled upon 
thirty ( 30) days' written notice by the Dealer 
4 
to Goodyear, or by Goodyear through its local 
m~nag~r to the Dealer. At the expiration of 
s~1d thirty ( 30) days, Goodyear shall have the 
right ~o cancel all unfilled orders, and during 
such time may refuse any orders in excess of the 
average thirty-day requirements of the Dealer 
based on orders actually given hereunder dur-
mg the term hereof. (Emphasis supplied). 
Paragraph twelve of the agreement states, in large 
print: 
12. The entire agreement regarding the sub-
ject matter is set forth herein. Any change in 
the printed terms, other than a change in the 
terms of settlement making all invoices payable 
C. 0. D., shall make this agreement void: No 
modification or amendment shall be effective 
unless in writing signed by an authorized rep-
resentative of the Dealer and by an executive 
officer of Goodyear. 
Plaintiff sought at the trial to introduce testimony 
that during the negotiations prior to June 21, 1962, 
defendant had represented "that the agreement be-
tween the parties would be for a five-year period." 
Defendant objected on the ground that the offered 
testimony would vary the terms of the written instru-
ment, and the trial court sustained the objection (R. 
68-70). 
The Goodyear franchise gave plaintiff two advan-
tages it had not previously enjoyed: it "opened up" for 
plaintiff "an avenue to establish forty [Texaco] sta-
tions" as additional TBA outlets; and it gave plaintiff 
for the first time a complete line of batteries and acces-
5 
sories-filters, spark plugs, fan belts, windshield wipers, 
etc.-. t.o .~om~lement its ~ine of tires ( R. 48-49, 72, 94), 
Plamhff s witnesses testified that plaintiff's TBA sales-
man, 'Valter Nelson, worked full-time calling on not 
only the forty Texaco stations, but the "hundreds" of 
other stations in the Salt Lake area, trying to sell all 
these products-tires, batteries, and accessories-from 
a fully-stocked delivery van. (R. 84, 132, 164, 176). 
Yet, despite this "greatly expanded" operation, 
Flinco's volume in Goodyear products never matched 
its earlier volume in Hood, which had been sold from 
the single outlet at 133 North First West. Its tire pur· 
chases, which had exceeded $54,000. (Hood) in the 
first half of 1962, fell to $34,000. (Goodyear) in the 
second half, and to only $12,000. (Goodyear) in the 
first half of 1963 (Ex. 5; R. 106-108). In part, this 
rapid decline was due to the hostility of some of the 
stations who purchased petroleum from other sources, 
who regarded Flinco and its own chain of stations as 
competitors and price-cutters and for this reason re· 
fused to patronize Flinco by purchases of TBA (R. 
ll3, ll6-ll8, 178). Thus, Flinco succeeded in identify· 
ingl only twelve of its "hundreds" of potential customers 
t The ultimate object of all TBA solicitation is to "identify" the 
station with the brand. As witness apRoberts described this goal: 
. . . [T]he service station operator, when, he goes i_nto 
handling TBA he identifies the station by puttmg up a sign, 
whether it is a G_oodyear sign _or a Firestone sign, ht; putsHa 
valance on his wmdows. He displays the Goodyear ti.res. e 
puts material on his station identified by G_oodr~c?, Fires.to~e 
or Goodyear. The whole station becomes 1dentJf1ed. This is 
the first thing you do. 
When you identify a sta~ion ~ou put tp.e identi~ication o~ 
you put the finish on, you identify mate~rnl. That is what w 
basically did with the ten to twelve stat10ns. (R. 129). 
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as (;oodyear retailers, and ten of these twelve-to whom 
plaintiff made "the bulk" of its sales-had been either 
owned by Flinco itself, or under contract to purchase 
petroleum from Flinco, before Flinco became a Good-
year dealer ( R. 61, 83-84, 86, 109, 132, 178). In the 
fifteen months' life of the Goodyear franchise, plain-
tiff was never able to realize a profit on its TBA opera-
tion (R. 128). 
Hoping "to at least try to make some money," 
Flinco began in .May, 1963, to carry a second line of 
tires, the "Miller" brand manufactured by B. F. Good-
rich ( R. 126, 128), which sold at retail at a bigger 
mark-up over wholesale cost than did Goodyear (R. 
189-190) .2 Although in June, 1962 it had regarded the 
expense of carrying two separate inventories as pro-
hibitive ( R. 81), plaintiff chose now, after eleven months 
of losses, to stock the Goodyear and Miller lines simul-
taneously. Almost immediately, Flinco's Goodyear 
business plummeted to rock-bottom. In May, 1963, in 
preparation for the big months of July and August 
( R. 132) , plaintiff purchased nearly $12,000. in Miller 
tires-more than double its purchases of Goodyear the 
same month (Ex. 5). In June, it shipped a large quan-
tity of these same Miller tires to a station which it had 
previously identified with Goodyear (R. 218) and 
throughout the summer of 1963 plaintiff's purchases 
of tires reflected a continuing emphasis on the new 
Miller line and a declining interest in Goodyear, as 
2 Goodyear also produced second-grade tires, which plaintiff 
could have carried had it wished. (R. 222) · 
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the following table, taken from Exhibit 5 
' illustrates: 
l\'Ionth of Invoice Miller Goodyear 
June $3,216.41 $1,253.95 
July $6,381.52 $ 982.55 
August $1,ll4.91 $ 7 45.3.5 
September $2,667.61 $ 468.12 
In July, Carl Crafts, Goodyear's \Vestern Re· 
gional l\'Ianager, and other Goodyear personnel met 
with apRoberts and discussed Flinco's TBA efforts. 
Crafts expressed concern over Flinco's failure to pene· 
trate a sufficient number of Texaco stations, and over 
the addition of the :Miller tire (R. 90, 143), and re· 
quested Dean Adams, a local Goodyear salesman, to 
survey the petroleum market "to see what penetration 
[Flinco] had made" and "to see if it was possible for 
[Flinco) to handle both lines of tires" (R. 91, 92, 143· 
144). The results of the survey were not introduced 
into evidence, but sometime prior to September Isl 
Goodyear's District .Manager recommended that the 
Flin co franchise be cancelled ( R. 155) . 
In early September, William Sweatt, newly-ap· 
pointed Goodyear District l\'Ianager, and a number 
of other Goodyear employees met with Flinco's prin· 
cipal officers at the Flinco office. By the accounts of 
plaintiff's witnesses, Goodyear "felt Flinco was i'.ot 
performing ... satisfactorily'', was "unhappy" with 
"Flinco production of Goodyear products" and "wanted 
to know what our future plans were and what, if any· 
[thing), we were doing to increase our activities as far 
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as the sale and promotion of Goodyear products were 
concerned" (R. 59, 62, 154, 205, 219). Flinco's presi-
dent replied that it contemplated one change only: to 
eliminate the fully-stocked delivery van in which its 
salesmen had called on stations, and to use instead a 
number of petroleum salesmen who would take orders 
which Flinco would fill when they returned to the office 
( R. 159-160, 176-177) . Even though these salesmen 
would also sell Texaco petroleum products, Flinco ex-
pected them to sell TBA to non-Texaco stations (R. 
177; but see R. 160). 
To Goodyear, the elimination of the delivery van 
indicated further curtailment of efforts at Goodyear 
sales (R. 63, 155), and Sweatt announced that he would 
follow the advice of his predecessors and cancel the 
contract (R. 155, 160). On September 16, 1963, de-
fendant sent plaintiff a written notice of cancellation, 
and for the next thirty days plaintiff continued to 
purchase Goodyear products (Ex. 2; R. 217). On 
September 19, plaintiff commenced this action (R. 5). 
Soon afterwards3 plaintiff replaced its Goodyear fran-
chise with one from B. F. Goodrich, under which it 
represented the B. F. Goodrich and Miller lines and 
B. F. Goodrich TBA up through the time of trial 
(R. 216; Ex. 10). At the time of trial in early 1965, 
plaintiff still had on hand $3,000. worth of Goodyear 
inventory which it had been unable to sell (R. 211-
212). 
' One of plaintiff's witnesses identified the lapse a_s "within a 
couple of weeks " although the date of the Goodrich contract 
would suggest that the period was about seven weeks. (R. 216; 
Ex. 10). 
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In addition to the foregoing facts, plaintiff pro-
duced evidence that during the summer of 1963, it was 
rumored in the trade either that Goodyear was about 
to cancel Flinco or that .Flinco was about to cancel 
Goodyear (R. 174, 194); but plaintiff produced no 
evidence as to who initiated the rumor, and one of 
plaintiff's witnesses admitted that it could have been 
a competitor or other third party ( R. 179) . 
Plaintiff's witnesses also testified to statements 
allegedly made by Goodyear employees to the effect 
that "it was not the policy of the Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Company to allow any distributor to handle 
another line of tires" ( R. 90, 152). But these same 
witnesses admitted that Goodyear had not required 
plaintiff to terminate its Hood line in order to take 
on Goodyear, that at least one other Goodyear dis· 
tributor in the area regularly sold competing brands, 
and that the very person alleged to have made one such 
statement thereupon authorized a study of plaintiff's 
sales success "to see if it was possible for [Flinco] to 
handle both lines of tires" (R. 92, 104, 127). Plain· 
tiff's witnesses also admitted that defendant is only 
one of four major tire companies in the Salt Lake 
market, that all four are represented locally in each 
major brand of service stations, and that competition 
between major tire companies is "brisk" and "stiff" 
(R. 62, 112-113, 147-148). 
At the close of this evidence the trial court granted 
defendant's motion for a directed verdict, relying on 
10 
authorities submitted in a memorandum by defendants 
at the start of trial, and cited hereafter. Of the con-
traet's cancellation clause, the trial court held: 
.. : B':'t ~he. fundamental proposition in this 
case i~ this. fh1s contract that these parties en-
tered mto has a provision in it that either one of 
them, the pl~intiff or .the defendant, upon giving 
a 30-day written notice, has the right to cancel 
this contract. 
~ t is an arbiti:ary provision, and the only re-
qmrement that is necessary is that the written 
notice be given. ( R. 225-226; cf. R. 224-230). 
On February 9, Hl65, plaintiff filed its notice of 
appeal from the judgment of the trial court (R. 29-31). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DI-
RECTED A VERDICT FOR DEFENDANT 
ON THE CLAIM FOR ALLEGED BREACH 
OF CONTRACT. 
A. The Contract's Termination Provisions Are Unam-
biguous. They Do Not Require Goodyear to Justify its Decision 
to Terminate Flinco's Dealership by a Showing of "Cood 
Cause." 
Defendant's motion in the trial court for a directed 
Yerd ict, and its argument here for an aff irmance of 
the trial court's judgment, rest principally upon para-
11 
graphs thirteen and fourteen of the written agreement 
(Ex. 1) , which in their entirety provide: 
. This agreement shall become effective when 
signed by an authorized District Manager of 
Goodyear and ~hall expire five ( 5) years from 
date. of execut10n .unless otherwise previously 
terminated as hereina,f ter provided. It cancels 
and supersedes any other Franchise Agreement 
and any other sales agreement now in effect be· 
tween the parties covering the sale by Goodyear 
to the Dealer of any product included hereund~r 
(Emphasis supplied). 
This agreement mav be cancelled upon thirty 
( 30) days' written notice by the Dealer to Good· 
year, or by Goodyear through its local manager 
to the Dealer. At the expiration of said thirty 
( 30) days, Goodyear shall have the right to 
cancel all unfilled orders, and during such time 
may refuse any orders in excess of the average 
thirty-day requirements of the Dealer based on 
orders actually given hereunder during the term 
hereof. (Emphasis supplied). 
We submit that this language entitled Goodyear 
to cancel the franchise for whatever reasons it deemed 
sufficient, so long as it gave plaintiff thirty days' written 
notice.4 The language is plain and unmistakable: Good· 
year was not required to justify its decision by pro· 
ducing proof of "good cause" in court. 
Almost universally, courts from other jurisdictions 
have refused to engraft a requirement of "good cause" 
4 The notice provisions were complied with (Ex._ 2), _and pl~i~· 
tiff continued to purchase Goodyear products until m1d-Octo e · 
(R. 217). 
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upon absolute rights of termination so clearly stated. 
Annot. 32 A.L.R. 209, 215 ( 1924) ; cf. 52 A.L.R. 
546, 547 (1928), 89 A.L.R. 252, 254 (1934). Thus, 
in Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 
116 F.2d 675 (2nd Cir. 1940), where the provisions 
under which Ford had cancelled a dealer's franchise 
provided that "this agreement may be terminated at 
any time at the will of either party by written notice 
to the other party ... ," the court regarded as irrele-
yant plaintiff's contention that the termination was 
"malicious, in bad faith, and contrary to the custom 
of the trade and therefore wrongful" and held (at 
p. 677): 
''Tith a power of termination at will here so 
unmistakably expressed, we certainly cannot 
assert that a limitation of good faith was any-
thing the parties had in mind. Such a limitation 
can be read into the agreement only as. an over-
riding requirement of public policy. This seems 
an extreme step for judges to take. The onerous 
nature of the contract for the successful dealer 
and the hardship which cancellation may bring 
him have caused some writers to advocate it, 
however; and an occasional case has seized upon 
elements of overreaching to come to such a result 
on particular facts. . . . But, generally speak-
ing, the situation arises from the strong bar-
gaining position which economic factors give 
the great automobile manufacturing companies: 
the dealers are not misled or imposed upon, but 
accept as nonetl~eless ad:vantageous a? agree-
ment in form bilateral, m fact one-sided. To 
attempt to redres~ this balance by judicial action 
without legislative authority appears to us a 
13 
doubt~'ul policy. \V ~ have not proper facilities 
to weigh ~con01~uc factors, nor have we before 
us a showmg of the supposed needs which may 
~ead the manufacturers to require these seem-
mgly harsh bargains . . . . 
Accord: Buggs v. l!'ord 1VI otor Co., 113 F. 2d 618 
(7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 688 ( 1940); 
Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkniyer Motor Co., 65 F.2d 1001 
(4th Cir. 1933) ; ~lartin v. li'ord .ftilotor Co., 93 F. 
Supp. 920 ( E.D. :Mich. 1950). 
Again, in .ftilotor Car Supply Co. v. General 
Hoiisehold Utilities Co., 80 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1935), 
the court refused to grant recovery to a dealer who had 
been canceled under a clause which read: "It is agreed 
that either party may terminate this agreement by 
giving thirty ( 30) days notice by registered mail to 
the other." The court stated at pp. 170-171: 
The law is well settled that, where a contract 
for the future delivery of personal property con· 
fers upon either party an arbitrary right of can· 
cellation prior to delivery, it is lacking in ~u· 
tuality and will be held binding upon the parties 
only to the extent that it has been performed . 
. . . And, with respect to distributors' contracts, 
like that here under consideration, it is equally 
well settled that such a contract, which does not 
bind the manufacturer to sell and deliv~r, .a~1d 
which is terminable at will, imposes no hab1hty 
upon him if he terminates it or refuses to make 
deliveries to the dealer. . . . [T]he contract 
merely "furnished a basis for future dealings .to 
be observed no longer than was mutually satis· 
14 
factory. There was no hard and fast commit-
ment of either party if he chose to break away." 
And in Brooks v. Sinclair Refining Co., 139 F.2d 
746 (10th Cir. 1944), the United St ates Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit refused to qualify a manu-
facturer's right to terminate a sales agency under the 
language, "either party may terminate this agreement 
at any time with or without cause." The court held at 
p. 747: 
The contract created an agency. Under it Sin-
clair was not bound to deliver any products to 
Brooks, the agent, for sale and was at liberty to 
reject, with or without cause, any orders taken 
by Brooks and either party could terminate t~e 
contract at any time with or without cause. The 
contract, in so far as it was executory, was wholly 
illusory. We conclude that termination of the 
contract imposed no liability upon Sinclair. 
For additional authority to the same effect, see: 
.American Machine & Metals, Inc. v. De Bothezat Im-
peller Co., Iru:., 180 F.2d 342 (2d. Cir. 1950), cert. 
denied, 339 U.S. 979 (1950); A. S. Rampell, Inc. v. 
Hyster Co., 144 N.E. 2d 371 (N.Y. 1957); Studebaker 
Corp. of America v. Wilson, 247 Fed. 403 (3rd Cir. 
1918); Mohawk Agency, Inc. v. American Casualty 
Co., 227 F. Supp. 745 (N.D.N.Y. 1964); Kane v. 
Chrysler Corp., 80 F. Supp. 360 (D.Del. 1948); Mc-
Clintock v. Truxell Sales & Service, Inc., 297 N.W. 
493 (Mich. 1941). 
The parties' agreement, we submit, does not limit 
their right to terminate by the standard of "good cause" 
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or by any other standard; and what the agreement so 
clearly states in this regard the cases affirm. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Excluded Evidence of Pre. 
liminary Negotiations. 
The excluded evidence that prior to June 21, 1962 
the parties had understood that the contract would 
continue for five years was offered for the purpose of 
resolving a presum~d "conflict" between paragraphs 
thirteen and fourteen of the con tract ( R. 68-69). As 
argued by appellant, those paragraphs are "contradic· 
tory and inconsistent" because one "provides that the 
agreement shall expire in five ( 5) years" and the other 
"provides that the agreement may be cancelled upon 
thirty days' written notice." (Br. p. 3). This trans· 
parent argument simply writes out of the contract the 
connecting bridge between the two provisos: "This 
agreement . . . shall expire five ( 5) years from date 
of execution unless otherwise previously terminated as 
hereinafter provided."5 The bridge replaced, the "con· 
flict" vanishes. If neither party affirmatively terminates 
the relationship earlier, the contract will automatically 
expire-fall of its own weight-in five years. 
At most, the rejected testimony could only hare 
resurrected a prior oral agreement, superseded by the 
terms of the writing. For not only is the written docu· 
ment free of ambiguity, it also recites (in paragraphs 
twelve and thirteen) that "the entire agreement regard· 
~ Plaintiff's brief virtually ignores this provision. Nowhere ~f. 
its brief does plaintiff set ~ort~ the entire contractural pro 
sions with respect to termmation. 
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ing the subject matter is set forth herein" and that the 
writing "cancels and supersedes" all earlier under-
standings. Even plaintiff's own cited cases acknowledge 
that "the court may not add, ignore, or discard words" 
in arriving at the parties' intent, Cornwall v. Willow 
Creelc Country Club, 13 Utah 2d 160, 369 P.2d 928 
( 1962) , and limit the interpretive role of parol evi-
dence to resolving ambiguities. Continental Bank and 
1'rust Company v. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 
890 ( 1955); Mathis v. Madsen, 1 Utah 2d 46, 261 P.2d 
952 ( 1953) . All this is horn book law. 
'Vhere one has contracted in writing to pay 
money, or to complete a building, or to deliver 
goods or to convey land, by a specified date, that 
contract supersedes and nullifies all antecedent 
understandings or agreements that this perform-
ance is to be rendered by a different date. Parol 
testimony to prove such an antecedent agree-
ment would be utterly irrelevant and immaterial, 
as long as it is not part of an attack upon the 
validity of the subsequently made written con-
tract. Again, if one contracts in writing (or oral-
ly) to buy and pay for property on the express 
condition that no war shall break out between 
this country and another before the day set for 
performance, neither oral nor written testimony 
will be relevant or material that the parties had 
a previous understanding or agreement to buy 
and pay for the property even if a war should 
break ~ut. 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 
§ .573, p. 369 (2d ed. 1960). 
On these well-settled principles, the proffered 
testimony was of no probative value whatever, and was 
properly excluded. 
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C. Paragraph Six of the Agreement Does Not Contradict 
Paragraph Fourteen. 
Plaintiff argues in its brief that a seeming conflict 
between paragraphs six and fourteen of the franchise 
agreement creates an ambiguity which requires the 
contract to be construed "most strongly against the 
party furnishing the form"-by which plaintiff seems 
to mean that neither Goodyear nor the dealer may cancel 
under paragraph fourteen unless the dealer is in de-
fault, as stated in paragraph six! Paragraph six states: 
Upon failure of the Dealer to make any pay· 
ments when due, Goodyear may, at its option, 
cancel this agreement or def er additional ship· 
ments until overdue accounts have been paid. 
Goodyear may decline to make deliveries except 
for cash whenever it is not satisfied with Dealer's 
financial responsibility. 
The function of paragraph six seems quite clear 
from its language. If the dealer fails to make payments 
when due, Goodyear may exercise any one of three 
additional remedies: it may "def er additional shipments 
until overdue accounts have been paid;" it may "decline 
to make deliveries except for cash;" or it may "cancel 
this agreement." If it chooses the last alternative, it 
is not bound, as it would be under paragraph fourteen, 
to continue to fill orders for thirty days after cancel· 
lation, but it may decline to make any such deliveries 
"except for cash." Paragraph six is designed simply 
to make available to Goodyear alternative courses of 
action in a situation where the thirty-day notice re· 
quirement of paragraph fourteen would prove onerous. 
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It does not qualify, across-the-board, the rights created 
by paragraphs thirteen and fourteen, as the fact that 
its remedies are available to Goodyear only and not 
to the dealer, attests. 
For the reasons given, plaintiff's attempt to dis-
card the plain words of the parties' contract is void 
of merit. The trial court properly directed a verdict 
for defendant on the breach of contract issue. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DI-
RECTED A VERDICT FOR DEFENDANT 
ON THE CLAIM OF VIOLATION OF SEC-
TION 50-1-2 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(1953). 
Plaintiff claims that even if the cancellation did not 
breach the parties' contract, it nevertheless did violate 
§ 50-1-2 UTAH ConE ANN. (1953) because it was moti-
vated by the fact that plaintiff had taken on the com-
peting Miller line. 
The statute in question provides: 
Any person or association of persons who shall 
create enter into, or become a member of or a 
party 'to, any pool, trust, agreem~nt, c~mbina­
tion, confederation or understandmg with any 
other person or persons to reg~late or fix the 
price of any article of merchandise or commod-
ity; or who shall enter into, or become a member 
of or a party to, any pool, trust, a~reement'. con-
tract, combination or confederation to fix or 
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limit th~ amop,rit or quantity of any article. 
co?1mod1ty or merchandise to be manufactured. 
mmed, produced or sold in this state shall ht 
deemed and adjudged guilty of a conspiracr 
to defraud, and shall be subject to punishmer;t 
as hereinafter provided. 
It is clear that in order to establish a violation of 
the statute, plaintiff must show both a "pool, trust, 
agreement, combination, confederation or understand-
ing with any other person or persons," and a purpose 
"to fix or limit the amount or quantity" of tires sold 
in the state of Utah. It is submitted that plaintiff's 
evidence fails to show either. 
A. The Record Contains No Evidence of Conspiracy. 
On the threshold requirement of a "pool, trmt, 
agreement, contract, combination or confederation," 
the sum total of plaintiff's evidence, considered in the 
light most favorable to plaintiff, tended to establish 
on{lJ a unilateral policy by Goodyear "not ... to allow 
any distributor to handle another line of tires." (R. 
90, 152). Plaintiff produced no evidence that any dis· 
tributor, anywhere, had agreed with Goodyear so to 
confine its activities, or that any distributor was so 
much as aware of this supposed policy at a time when 
it dealt exclusivelv in defendant's products. Indeed, 
one may search tl;e record in vain for the name of.a 
single Goodyear dealer who did deal exclusively Ill 
defendant's products. 
None of plaintiff's cited cases will support the 
proposition that a unilateral policy of refusing to sell 
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to dealers who handle competing lines violates the 
conspiracy provisions of any antitrust law. Other cases 
hold flatly that such a policy is not unlawful. Theatre 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing 
Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-541 (1954) (Sherman Act); 
Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 
211 ( 1951) (Sherman Act) ; Paramount Film Dis-
t rilJll iiny Corp. v. Villaye Theater, Inc., 228 F.2d 721 
(10th Cir. 1955) (Sherman Act) ; Brosius v. Pepsi-
Co/a Co., 155 F.2d 99, 102 (3rd Cir. 1946) (Sherman 
Act); Arzee Supply Corp. of Conn. v. Ruberoid Co., 
222 F. Supp. 237 (D. Conn. 1963) (Sherman Act); 
Dart Drug Corp v. Parke, Davis & Co., 221 F. Supp. 
948 (D.C.D.C. 1963) (Sherman Act); Nelson Radio 
& Supply Co., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 
(5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953) 
(Sherman and Clayton Acts); Leo J. Meyberg Co. 
v. Eureka TVilliams Corp., 215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954) (Clayton 
Act); Associated Beverages Co. v. P. Ballantine & 
Sons, 287 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1961) (Clayton Act); 
A.B.C. Distributing Co. v. Distillers Distributing 
Corp., 316 P.2d 71 (Calif. 1957) (Calif. antitrust law). 
As early stated by the Supreme Court in FTC 
t'. Ra.i;mond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565, 573 (1924): 
It is the right, "long recognized," of a trader 
engaged in an entirely private busin.ess, ''.freely 
to exercise his own independent discretion as 
to the parties with whom he will deal." United 
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307, 63 
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L: ed. 992, 996, 7 .A.L.R. 443, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
4?5-. See also Umted States v. Trans-Missouri 
I• reight Asso., 166 U.S. 290, 320, 41 L. ed 100' 1~020, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540; Dueber YVatcl;: 
\ase l\Hg. Co. v. E. Howard \Vatch & Clod 
Co., 14 C.C.A. 14, 35 U.S. Ap~. 16, 66 Feil. 
637, 645; Great Atlantic & Pacific 'fea Co r 
Cream of 'Vheat Co., 141 C.C.A. 594, 227 I<;ed: 
.J.6, 48; 'Vholesale Grocers' Asso. v. Federal 
Trade Commission ( C.C.A.) 277 Fed. 657, 664; 
l\Iennen Co. v. Federal Trade Commission 
(C.C.A.) 30 A.L.R. 1120, 288 Fed. 774, 780; 
Alfred \Y. Booth & Co. v. Burgess, 72 N.J. 
Eq. 181, 190, 65 Atl. 226; and 2 Cooley, Torts, 
3d ed. 587. Thus. a retail dealer "has the un· 
questioned right to stop dealing with a whole· 
saler for reasons satisfactory to himself." East· 
ern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Asso. r. 
United States, 234 U.S. 600, 614, 58 L. ed. 
1490, 1500, L.R.A. 1915A, 788, 34 Sup. Ct. 
Rep. 951; United States v. Colgate & Co. supra, 
p. 307. He may lawfully make a fixed rule of 
conduct not to buy from a producer or manu· 
facturer who sells to consumers in competition 
with himself. Grenada Lumber Co. v. Missis· 
sippi, 217 U.S. 433, 440, 54 L. ed. 826, 830, 30 
Sup. Ct. Rep. 535. Or he may stop deal_ing 
with a wholesaler who he thinks is acting unfairly 
in trying to undermine his trade. Eastern States 
Retail Lumber Dealers' Asso. v. United States, 
supra, p. 614; United States v. Colgate & Co. 
supra, p. 307. Likewi~e a '~holesale dealer !:as 
the right to stop dealmg with a manufacturer 
"for reasons sufficient to himself." And he may 
do so because he thinks such manufacturer 15 
undermining his trade by selli.ng ei_ther t? a co~· 
peting wholesaler or to a retailer competmg with 
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his own customers. Such other wholesaler or re-
tailer has the reciproc~l right to stop dealing with 
the manufacturer. This each may do, in the exer-
cise of free competition, leaving it to the manu-
facturer to determine which customer in the ex-
ercise of his own judgment, he desire~ to retain. 
On the authority of the fore going cases, we submit 
that a unilateral policy to refuse to deal, whatever the 
motive, does not in and of itself constitute evidence of 
a "pool, trust, agreement, contract, combination or 
confederation" within the prohibition of § 50-1-2 of 
the Utah statutes. 
B. The Record Contains no Evidence of Intent to Restrict 
the Quantity of Goods to be Sold in the State. 
Not only did plaintiff fail to produce evidence of 
a combination or conspiracy, it failed to produce evi-
dence that Goodyear intended "to fix or limit the 
amount or quantity of any article ... to be ... sold 
in this state"-the second sine qua non of the statute. 
As cases arising under the federal antitrust laws have 
recognized, exclusive dealing contracts are not always 
conceived in sin. They sometimes have legitimate pur-
poses and no adverse competitive effects, and under 
federal law, therefore, they are not per se unlawful. 
Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 
320 (1961); Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor 
Co., 267 F. 2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959). 
Plaintiff here produced no evidence that Good-
~'ear 's "policy" was intended substantially to lessen 
competition in tires or to limit the quantity of tires 
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so~d by plaintiff or anyone else in Utah. The sliglii 
e_vidence of record, indeed, hints that Goodyear mai 
s.1mply l~ave been concerned that dealers carrying othe.r 
Imes might lack the capital and personnel to stock 
fully and represent the Goodyear line as well-a con. 
cern which plaintiff at one time shared (R. 81). For. 
in the only examples supplied by the record, Goodvear 
(a) freely supplied the dealer (Big 'O' in Bountiful! 
even though the dealer carried competing lines (R. 
127), and (b) und~rtook a study of the dealer's (plain· 
tiff's) sales success "to see if it was possible for [the 
dealer J to handle both lines of tires" ( R. 92) . 
Unlike Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 G.S. 
293 (1949) ,6 where the government produced evidence 
that Standard's exclusive dealing contracts tied to ii.I 
products nearly 6,000 independent retail gasoline out· 
lets having an annual volume in excess of $65,000,000., 
plaintiff here produced no evidence that any Goodyear 
dealer had agreed to boycott competing lines or that 
any Goodyear dealer (other than plaintiff itself) ban 
in fact-independently or otherwise-quit a competing 
line. Here the evidence of record tends to dispel all 
suspicions that Goodyear's alleged policy injured com· 
6 The Standard Oil case relied on by plaintiff involved a fede.ral 
act (section 3 of the Clayton Act) which prohibit~ exc.lu~1ve 
dealing contracts where the effect of such contracts is to miure 
competition or tend to create a monopoly. H~re the Utah statule 
prohibits combinations, contracts, confederacies, etc., whose pur· 
pose is to restrict the quantity of goods sold. In the federal case 
the question was whether the reqt~ire~ents c_ontracts in ques)rnn 
used by Standard Oil Company with its stations tended to bmit 
competition for the station operator',s business. Both the ~ac); 
and the law in that case are mapposite to the statute a1:1d acj 
in the case at bar: .Here pl?-intiff has fai.led to show either:! 
the statutory requisites, which are far different from those 
the federal act. 
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petition or limited the quantity of tires sold in Utah. 
Goodyear was one of four major tire companies in 
the Salt Lake area, all four were represented in the 
major gas stations, and Goodyear was the last of the 
four to be recognized by Texaco. Competition, insofar 
as the record shows, was "brisk" and "stiff." (R. 44, 
62, 112-113, 147-148). 
On this evidence, no jury could justifiably have 
found that Goodyear's alleged "policy" of exclusive 
dealing was intended to, or did, "fix or limit the . 
quantity" of goods to be sold in the state of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has wholly failed to produce evidence 
from which the trier of fact might have found that 
defendant had either breached its contract with plain-
tiff or had violated the antitrust laws of the state of 
Ctah. The trial court correctly excluded evidence which 
would have yaried the terms of the written agreement, 
and even if such evidence had been admitted, it would 
not luffe been sufficient to send the breach of contract 
issue to the jury. Plaintiff's failures of proof require 
an affirmance of the judgment of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of July, 1965. 
PETER lV. BILLINGS 
G. KENNETH HANDLEY, JR. 
Fabian & Clendenin 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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